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Are Donors Ready For Change? 
by Anders Danielson, Paul Hoebink and Benedict Mongula 
Examining bilateral donors in particular, this artic/,e discusses how these agencies have tried to 
overcome the prob/,ems associated with TC and why reforms have lagged during the decade since 
fundamental flaws began emerging clearly. Both TC and the project approach associated with 
it will probably remain major modes of channeling ODA - simply because no viable alternatives 
exist in certain recipient countries and for certain activities. Whatever the case, TC can spur 
capacity if donors bear in mind the need to: ( 1) coordinate aid; (2) address conflicts within the 
donor community explicitly; (3) educate home publics; (4) develop capacity within aid organi-
sations; (5) use national execution modalities wherever possible. 
Technical cooperation (TC) comes in many colours. For some, it is the use of expa-
triate experts on long-term missions, working with local counterparts. For others, it 
is mainly "gap-filling", i.e., the use of foreign expertise for functions for which local 
capacity is insufficient. For still others, it amounts to capacity development, a prob-
lematic term in itself. 
The OECD-DAC database defines TC as both "grants to nationals of aid recipient 
countries receiving education or training at home or abroad" and "payment to con-
sultants, advisers and similar personnel as well as teachers and administrators serving 
in recipient countries (including the cost of associated equipment)". Further, it 
states, " ... assistance of this kind provided specifically to facilitate the implementation 
of a capital project is included indistinguishably among bilateral project and pro-
gramme expenditures, and is omitted from technical cooperation in statistics of 
aggregate flows". 1 
Several caveats must be borne in mind in both this definition and the major criti-
cisms of TC. First, the contrast between technical cooperation and capacity 
development (CD) is something ofa chimera. Although TC has grave problems, CD 
cannot wholly replace it. The instruments of capacity development are classified by 
the DAC as those for TC delivery. Yet the converse does not hold: some components 
of TC do not qualify as instruments of CD. 
Second, TC is traditionally delivered in the form of projects. But although their 
appropriateness is being questioned, projects remain precisely what many recipients 
want in varied kinds of activity. One must try to avoid throwing out the baby with the 
bath-water. 
1 OECD/DAC, Development Cooperation Report 1999, Technical Notes to Statistical Appendix, p. 6. 
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Third, the bulk of the literature that criticises TC deals largely with sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
However, a counter-caveat exists as well: this study focuses on bilateral donors, except 
for a brief note on UNDP experience in Latin America. Neither multilateral nor pri-
vate organisations are discussed. And some multilaterals, among them UNDP, have 
no mandate to move away from TC - as yet. If and when bilateral donors find ways 
of delivering technical cooperation that increase local capacity both sustainably and 
cost-effectively, multilateral and other aid organisations will probably change as well. 
Moreover, virtually none of the available literature focuses on the organisational 
problems of donors - though we assume that a number of internal papers do. While 
this obviously limits the value of this article's conclusions, it should not preclude the 
likelihood of change now under way. 
Changing Donor TC Practices: Problems, Reforms and Obstacles 
Since the Forss report of 1988, a number of TC agencies, notably those of Germany 
and the Nordic countries, commissioned reports on the impact of TC. Though many 
of these evaluations identify the definition of TC objectives as a major weakness, 
none provides concrete recommendations for improving the process. They do, how-
ever, point to ambition as a leading problem, particularly as it relates to institutional 
development and the transfer of knowledge. 
Insofar as the evaluations deal with donor organisations, they stress flexibility as a 
prime need. Some recommend decentralising responsibility and authority to the 
field level. Others urge organisations to broaden the scope of their products. They 
also raise questions of the time involved in recruitment and selection procedures, as 
well as problems in monitoring, evaluation and reporting. 
All in all, the criticisms can be summed up fairly telegraphically: TC is supply- rather 
than demand-driven. It undermines local capacity, distorts local labour markets, 
lacks sustainability, has negative impact on self-esteem in the aid-receiving countries, 
and is often of low quality. It also causes a fragmentation of aid and thus detracts 
from the coherence of policies and programmes. Its immense costs derive in large 
measure from tying aid to TC suppliers and other practices that benefit donor rather 
than recipient countries. 
Nonetheless, several reports suggest gap filling in situations where absolute short-
ages of local personnel prevailed. Moreover, under specific conditions, they see 
supplementing local salaries as the sole realistic option. They also point to signifi-
cant benefits from measures at the level of primary or secondary employment 
(incentive schemes) and encouraged adequate human resource development within part-
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ner organistions. Some reports praise twinning, a long-term institutional coopera-
tion between organisations in the North and South that undertake activities in the 
same field. 
What are the Problems? 
Despite the marked decline of ODA since the 1980s, TC grants within it increased 
from less than 20 per cent early in that decade to over one-quarter by the late 1990s. 
Nor have they dwindled appreciably in absolute numbers: roughly $6 billion per 
annum was disbursed in the late 1990s, approximately the same amount as that dis-
bursed 15 years earlier. Does this mean that the mission of building sustainable, 
locally-funded local capacity has failed? 
Such indeed appears to be the case in Africa. According to Edward Jaycox, the for-
mer Vice President for the Africa Region at the World Bank, ( 1993: 1), " . . . donors 
and African governments together have in effect undermined capacity in Africa; they 
are undermining it faster than they are building it". The Berg report (1993: 244) 
concludes that "almost everybody acknowledges the ineffectiveness of technical 
cooperation in what is or should be its major objective: achievement of greater self-
reliance in the recipient countries by building institutions and strengthening local 
capacities in national economic management". The 1995 Portfolio Review of World 
Bank technical assistance loans found only 19 per cent to be performing· satisfacto-
rily (Baser and Morgan, 1997: 7), and there had been little improvement in 
performance since the mid 1980s. And there is a consensus that technical coopera-
tion has performed least favourably in the area that should be its principal focus, 
namely institutional capacity building (Arndt, 2000: 164). 
As to TC costs, the Berg report asserts that the total disbursed often widely exceeds 
the aggregate civil service remuneration in recipient countries. The OECD/ DAC 
corroborates this for most West African countries. Indeed, in the very special case of 
Mali, bilateral TC appears to be larger than the entire civil service wage bill. Yet 
Arndt (2000: Table 6.2) shows that the share of TC in total ODA has increased from 
the early 1970s to the mid-l 990s in all recipient regions. 
Even though the DAC data show a declining trend in the cost per person-month 
for TC-experts - a trend which suggests an increasing reliance on locally hired 
experts - the cost is still high, particularly in view of at times questionable outputs. 
Since TC is often bundled by donors (a package of experts, equipment and train-
ing), aid tying - although condemned in principle by DAC - prevails. Moreover, 
recipient governments accept expatriate TC personnel because they may some-
times act as a disguised (albeit rather inefficient) form of subsidy to the 
government budget. 
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The high cost of TC also derives from other forms of tying aid, including restrictions 
on the geographical source of goods as well as services - a package of equipment and 
training as well as experts. Also condemned in principle by DAC, this kind of 
bundling prevails. 
The tying of aid contributes significantly to the perception that donors drive TC. 
Projects are conceived, designed and implemented by donors with little (and late) 
input from recipients and then delivered according to donor priorities that are not 
consonant with the recipient government's expenditure priorities. This limits recip-
ient commitment to (or "ownership" of) the project and, consequently, its 
sustainability. In addition, because of donor bundling with little input from recipi-
ents, TC is often perceived as having very low opportunity costs, or none at all: 
accepting a TGpackage as presented by a particular donor is (mistakenly) seen as 
having no impact on other flows of aid from that particular donor. 
Moreover, the standard model for delivering TC and fostering CD has long been the 
resident expatriate-local counterpart (RELC) model (even though donors now seem to rely 
increasingly on using short-term experts). For many reasons, this deeply flawed model 
often fails to increase capacity through transferring knowledge to local counterparts. 
The foreign experts have as their main objective getting the job done. They have few 
incentives to invest in the transfer of knowledg·e; they are usually more experienced 
than tl1e local counterpart, and certainly better paid. In addition, the careers oflocal 
counterparts are often better served by a frequent shifts of jobs - some of which may 
include control of project moneys, equipment and information. 
As Berg (1993:248), among others, has observed, "powerful forces" draw TC per-
sonnel to their emphasis on "hard" outputs rather than the "soft" targets of institution- and 
capacity building. Their bosses want tangible outputs; these benefit the experts' own 
careers. Other factors come into play as well: the internal values of the experts them-
selves; and a frequently unfriendly environment for focusing on soft targets - the low 
commitment of counterparts, instability of national leadership, and lack of finance. 2 
Finally, the countries in which donor-driven TC predominates - those in which a 
transfer of managerial authority is most needed - are the countries that are least 
capable of mustering the organisational resources, analytical capacity and the ability 
to set and implement national priorities necessary for a successful integration of 
technical cooperation resources into national development plans. 
1 In recent years there has been a shift of emphasis from capacity building to capacity utilisation, the major argument being 
that in the past two decades most countries have manages to build local capacity (Grindle and Hildebrand, 1995; 
Fukuda-Parr, 1996). However from the point of view of donor behaviour with respect to technical cooperation, the prob-
lems are still much the same. 
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This has several implications, none of which makes TC more effective. First, it makes 
donors reluctant to hand over responsibility for TC authority to recipients. They 
doubt the government's administrative capacity. They worry about corruption and 
inefficiencies. They fear loss of control over projects and programmes, the priorities 
of which have been set by donor headquarters and national legislatures. Second, 
since government capacity is weak, implementation of aid projects is slow - some-
thing that is compounded by the proliferation of donors, each with its own routines, 
forms and regulations for reporting, procurement and evaluation. This leads to an 
encouragement of continued donor control, which reinforces the focus on tangible 
outputs and gives less emphasis to capacity building efforts. 
Third, the erosion of the public sector in many African countries creates a dilemma 
for donors. On the one hand, salaries of key personnel - such as technicians or man-
agers - are often very low, which forces people to moonlight to make ends meet. On 
the other hand, paying salary supplements to ensure proper staffing for project 
administration distorts incentives, disrupts salary structures and may even obstruct 
civil service reform. The DAC recommended as early as 1991 that salary supplements 
should be avoided in principle and this may have contributed to an increasingly con-
voluted structure where donor bidding for local staff takes the form of disguised 
competition that distorts structures even further. 
The problem of salary supplements is basically a conflict between interests. On the 
one hand, donors can implement projects better and more efficiently if they are able 
to employ capable staff. On the other hand, the payment of salary supplements may 
distort the civil service salary structure, impede reform of the civil service and jeop-
ardise the objective of long-term sustainability of projects. Much as with project 
management units, the conflict inherent in salary supplements may be seen as a 
Prisoners' Dilemma - where what is rational for the individual donor is not rational 
for the collectivity of donors (Danielson and Mjema, 1999: Ch. 6). 
In this connection, different donors face different constraints that impact on their 
ability to move away from this. For some, such as Sweden, the existence of multi-year 
programmes makes the pressure to disburse less acute, while for others the funds 
that are not disbursed in a particular year are not carried over into the next year. For 
those donors, salary supplements, or the creation of project management units, may 
be more or less necessary to avoid falling into the non-disbursement trap. 
How have Donors Responded? 
Over the last 20 years, donor countries have tried to deal with the problem areas 
discussed above. One of the paradoxes we observed is the difference between 
donor responses in international fora such as the DAC and their responses at the 
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field level. Thus, for instance, although all DAC members endorsed the 1991 rec-
ommendation that salary supplementation would in principle be avoided, it 
remains a practice in many recipient countries. Similarly, they approved the DAC 
Partnership Strategy resolutions on aid tying (the only reservation being made and 
known to the authors is Denmark - cf. DAC, 1999: 54). Yet, tying aid prevails and 
the share of tied aid has apparently not declined much from its level of 41 per cent 
in the early 1990s. These contradictions indicate constraints on TC reform, to 
which we will return. 
Channing Arndt (2000: 167) notes that most of the proposed reforms concerned 
changing donor behaviour; his non-exhaustive list is worth quoting at length: 
• Make the basic TC project structure work better. Institutional development 
goals could be better achieved through, for instance, more specific terms of 
reference, greater weight to institutional development skills in hiring of 
experts, reduced emphasis on tangible outputs, greater care in project prepa-
ration to ensure that priority needs are addressed, greater emphasis on 
training and more attentive pairing of experts with counterparts. More 
recently, improved gender awareness in the design of TC projects and among 
TC personnel has been added to this list buttressed by concerted advocacy 
efforts, a rapidly expanding literature on gender issues and gender training. 
• Modify the basic TC project structure. In particular, make much greater use 
of short-term TC personnel (often with multiple visits and contact by elec-
tronic mail in between visits) as opposed to long-term resident advisers, 
and expand the relative size of the training budget. In addition, where pos-
sible, consider "twinning" of like institutions between developed and 
developing countries. 
• Resort to comprehensive planning of TC. In this case, donors and the gov-
ernment would come together and agree on a comprehensive programme .... 
Specific activities (projects) within the programme would then be paired with 
specific donors. 
The most important of the many reforms that have taken place in recent years is 
arguably the move from individual projects towards a sector-wide approach (SWAp). 
The many definitions of this approach may explain the enthusiasm for it. One might 
even say that the move has been less from projects to SWAps than from projects to 
what UNDP terms a programme approach. In short, the major change has not focused 
on sectors as units of analysis, but rather on less earmarking of funds. 
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In this light, we can better understand the trend among several bilateral donors -
including Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden - away from projects 
into providing resources to the government for use in a specific sector. In addition, 
Japan has moved towards a new approach based largely on country strategies -
which, inter alia, is expected to improve coordination of Japanese foreign aid. 
This may help solve some of the problems conventionally associated with TC. First, 
it gives the recipient government more responsibility, which means that government 
commitment may increase and that aid funds may be better integrated into the 
national development strategy. Second, a SWAp makes it easier for the government 
to provide a comprehensive plan on how to use aid resources. Third, since SWAps 
are often (sectoral) budget support, the government may- in the best of cases - take 
ownership for allocating aid resources among different activities, which may lead to 
a better utilisation of technical cooperation resources, and less reliance on foreign 
expertise when local capacities exist. Indeed, one could argue that many countries 
need not more aid, but a different composition of aid - preferably more untied aid 
and more budget support. 
Nonetheless, SWAps range from lists of projects relating to a specific sector with a bit 
of policy dialogue thrown in to sectoral budget support in which the government is 
expected to assume full responsibility for identification, monitoring and evaluation, 
while donors provide finance and engage in policy dialogue. In countries charac-
terised by weak governments, giving governments more responsibility increases the 
risk of reducing efficiency in the use of aid resources. This is a particular acute con-
cern for the countries in which the need for TC is the largest, i.e., the countries with 
the weakest capacity for national management. What is needed is a central authori-
ty that is able to make allocational decisions without having to pay too much 
attention to various interest groups. 
Another welcome reform gradually being implemented by several donors is the move 
away from long-term expatriate advisers. Norway and Sweden rely to an increasing 
degree on local consultants and report that they have no long-term foreign advisers in 
several recipient countries (including Tanzania, a major recipient for both these 
donors). Canada, traditionally a donor that has relied heavily on TC, has increased the 
share of local consultants, even though foreign (i.e., Canadian) experts still account 
for the lion's share. Denmark - surprisingly- has increased its reliance on long-term 
expatriate advisers (DANIDA, 2001), despite a move towards sector-wide approaches 
and less use of long-term foreign consultants from 1994 onwards. In addition, the 
Danish evaluation indicates that the increased reliance on long-term advisers - the 
number of person-years increased by almost 50 percent between 1996 and 2000 - is 
driven by DANIDA rather than by demands from recipients. 
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Both Japan and the USA differ from other donors for other reasons. Japan relies 
heavily on expatriate (mostly Japanese) experts and still makes heavy use of the res-
ident expert/local counterpart model that other donors have largely phased out. For 
JICA, the model seems to work as intended. By contrast, the U.S. channels much of 
its aid through private voluntary organisations (PVOs) that work directly with civil 
society or the private sector and thus are able to circumvent some of the problems 
encountered in bilateral aid proper. In addition, since USAID-registered PVOs are 
required to find the bulk of finance from sources other than the US government, it 
is extremely difficult to estimate the amount of aid that the US gives, including tech-
nical assistance. 
Another widely accepted change is the shift from TC proper to CD. Norway and 
Sweden no longer use the term TC to designate aid funds, but prefer to see advisers, 
training activities and other activities conventionally associated with TC as a part of 
a more general approach to improve local capacity. To what extent this entails real 
change is unclear, but both these countries - along with some others, including 
Netherlands and Canada - appreciate the problems in TC and appear determined 
to find other ways to increase capacity in recipient countries. 
However, where local capacity for formulating priorities and coordinating aid 
resources is weak, aid tends to remain donor-driven. The way out is not necessarily 
more TC to build capacity so that the large aid flows can be handled, but a firm focus 
on development priorities that, ideally, are driven by the recipient government, but 
to which all stakeholders contribute. 
Tanzania is a case in point. During the last five years the country has been able to 
form a Public Expenditure Review (PER) process led by government in which all 
donors (and civil society) participate, a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) into which the results from the PER are fed, and an Assistance Strategy for 
aid that is linked to the MTEF. In addition, the multilateral debt fund has been trans-
formed into a general budget support facility in which eight of the major donors 
participate and in which donor and government representatives discuss policy in 
quarterly meetings. This means that the allocation of resources - including aid - is 
determined in negotiations between government, civil society and donors within the 
frame of the country's general development strategy (which remains financed to a 
significant extent by donor resources). But the government sets the priorities so that 
needs emerge clearly, among them those for "gap-filling". The room for donor-driv-
en processes has consistently shrunk. 
However, this model may not necessarily be replicable elsewhere. Tanzania is cur-
rently blessed with several competent economists in the donor community, many of 
which have worked together for several years, a highly competent and committed 
Are Donors Ready For Change 7 169 
staff in the World Bank country office - including Professor Ndulu, a Tanzanian and 
one of Africa's most respected economists - and several immensely resourceful indi-
viduals in senior positions in key ministries, including the Planning Commission, the 
Treasury and the Bank of Tanzania. But one must also remember that donors have 
supported higher education in Tanzania, which may help explain why so many excel-
lent experts are working in the country simultaneously - in government, with 
donors, in research institutes or at the university. 
Why Is Change So Difficult? 
Even in 1994, OECD stated that the adjustment of technical cooperation lagged 
behind the changed international and national contexts. Several donor countries 
have had difficulty adjusting their TC policies to new situations and new political and 
administrative environments in developing countries. In part a lack of national poli-
cies on human resource development and capacity building among recipients has 
posed problems in analysing needs for personnel assistance. Donor policy docu-
ments have not factored in labour markets in developing countries or alterations in 
their institutions. This may also stem from the complex organisation of TC in the 
donor countries itself, as the Netherlands TC study demonstrates. Each organisation 
also faces vested interests that often make change difficult; both the development indus-
try that depends on the organisation and its own headquarters staff tend to favour 
the status quo. Greater goal-oriented restructuring and higher professionalism, as 
recommended by a Finnish evaluation, do not suffice. External political pressures 
are also needed, along with analyses of the perceptions of the "free goods" that come 
with TC. Some TC organisations are trying to build new relationships by instituting 
local advisory councils in cooperation with local government agencies or local NGOs 
to formulate and operationalise policies for the recipient country involved. 
Many early evaluations criticised the selection, training and conduct of experts and 
volunteers, largely in terms of their preparation and training with regard to knowl-
edge oflocal structures and cultures.' Some organisations have tried to address these 
problems by conducting- training in the recipient countries. Even so, many experts 
and volunteers lived in isolated, "white" environments, taking little part in such local 
social events as marriages and funerals. Often, huge salary differences also widen 
social gaps. But whether or not the "indigenisation" of TC organisations has reduced 
social and cultural distance remains to be demonstrated. 
In most TC organisations, field offices play an important role in identifying projects 
and partner bodies; in managing programmes and relations with partner organisa-
tions and other institutions related to the programme; and negotiating programmes 
3 Berg (1993:11). 
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with partner organisations. To enhance flexibility and better understand local needs, 
several TC organisations have delegated responsibilities to the field and decentralised 
their operations during the past ten years. They have also done so to enable South-
South cooperation. This has often led to major shifts at headquarters, including 
"identity crises" where headquarters staff had to search for new, meaningful tasks, 
even when organisational change took place over several years. In many cases head-
quarters staff have allowed field offices only limited decision-making powers. 
On the other hand, "autonomous" field offices can seek to protect their range of 
action by circumventing procedures or policies deemed necessary by headquarters 
and justifying such action, especially with regard to M&E directives, with the atti-
tude that headquarters has little idea of field realities.4 All TC organisations have 
sig·nificant problems with evaluation and monitoring. Most do not have well-
equipped evaluation services or clear instructions for field personnel. Central 
offices still stress input rather than the assessment of TC effectiveness, especially 
with regard to capacity building. 
This is indeed difficult to evaluate, in part because of methodological problems.5 
Determining "who is learning what from whom or what?" becomes particularly com-
plicated when counterparts are absent, as is often the case, or the expert has not 
been present during much of the TC deployment period. The question becomes 
even more difficult with regard to institution-building. The problem of attribution 
seems to loom even larger in TC than in other forms of development assistance. 
Developing· indicators for M&E remains in its infancy. 
Beyond all the observations above, aid organisations appear to have poor institu-
tional memory. Our research showed that current staff appeared unaware of old 
evaluations and their conclusions and recommendations, let alone whether these 
had been incorporated into policy formulations, procedures and instruments. In 
some cases, this seems to suggest that little progress had been made since the first 
critical evaluations began to appear ten years ago. 
Nonetheless, there seems to be a growing awareness, particularly in the World Bank 
reports, that technical aid generally takes place under very difficult situations, often 
extreme in the least developed countries and the areas sometimes termed "disad-
vantaged". If judgements do not take these difficulties into account, TC looks 
undeservedly worse than other forms of aid. 
4 An example might be here the Dutch "volunteer" organisation, SNV, tried to set up an M&E system in the early 1990s, 
which foundered because of res istance in the field. 
5 Forss (1988:68); World Bank (1996:5). 
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What Are the Conditions for Successful Change? 
Despite general agreement that TC has failed to deliver sustained improvements in 
capacity development, most of the failures have taken place in Africa, the poorest 
continent with the smallest indigenous capacity for absorbing large aid flows, partic-
ularly TC. In Latin America, however, UNDP experience suggests that TC is relatively 
efficient as a way of increasing capacity and transferring knowledge. 
Noting these differentials in success, donors have reacted in two ways. First, they 
have diverted TC resources from Africa to other countries, particularly those in 
the former Soviet Union. Against the general decline in aid transfers to Africa 
during the last decade, the fall of TC stands out as far larger than the reduction 
of other types of aid; per capita TC has halved during the last 25 years. Consequently, 
a significant change has taken place in the structure of aid to Africa - from TC to 
other, more fungible, forms of aid, particularly debt relief, budget support and 
sector support. 
Second, donors have tried to invent new forms of aid delivery to circumvent some of 
the problems associated with TC. This is true both at the macro-level, including the 
increased emphasis on debt relief, and the resurrection of sector support, and with-
in TC itself: the use of long-term resident expatriate experts has decreased, and 
emphasis has shifted from transfers of technical knowledge to capacity development. 
However, this change has been largely uncoordinated. Moreover, the ability or will-
ingness to change varies considerably between donors. It would be fair to say, 
however, that no donor has completely overcome the problems associated with TC -
even though for some the problem has apparently disappeared simply because they 
no longer use the term. 
The Current Role ofTC in Aid Packages 
We can distinguish three major strands of change in aid philosophy over the past 
two decades. First, the increasing realisation that recipients' ownership of the devel-
opment process determines the success of aid has meant not only a shift to more 
fungible forms of aid, but increased dialogue with the recipient government and -
perhaps most important of all - increased concern about the recipient's ability to 
handle aid flows. 
Second, the old idea of foreign aid as investments has become largely obsolete. 
While much foreign aid still finances the recipient's development budget, donors 
have increasingly realised that the distinction between capital and recurrent costs is 
difficult to maintain. Hence, inter alia, the renewed interest in SWAps. The flexibili-
ty of SWAps ideally allows the recipient government to decide the allocation of funds 
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among various types of expenditures within a sector (such as investments and main-
tenance), and permits different donors to support the same sector despite differing 
interpretations among them of what SWAp constitutes. Thus, some donors see 
SWAps as sectoral budget support, while others view it as a list of projects within a 
specific sector. 
Third, while many donors long saw lack of capacity as the major constraint for the 
successful deployment of aid, the past two decades have witnessed substantial build-
ups of local capacity. In many countries, therefore, focus has shifted from capacity 
creation to capacity utilisation - with profound implications. If capacity utilisation 
moves centre stage, more attention must be paid to issues of the tying of TC and the 
selection of experts. Nonetheless, this change of focus does not amount to a denial 
the lack of capacity in many countries - and, consequently, the continued need for 
foreign expertise, both as gap-fillers and as vehicles for building local capacity. 
Why Has Reform Changed the Broad Aid Picture So Little? 
Because the changes sketched above have taken place in a largely piece-meal and 
uncoordinated fashion, they have had no major impact. This is particularly true 
because the most flexible donors tend to be those that supplied relatively little aid as 
TC in the first place. If, for example, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden reform, 
they will have only limited impact on aid effectiveness as long as other donors that 
supply far more TC continue along their former path. Despite willingness to change, 
these donors may not have the requisite skills. Moreover, there is very little discus-
sion of wha t donors themselves gain from giving aid as TC - although there is a 
distinct possibility that these benefits add to a reluctance to change, at least on the 
recipients' terms. All in all, we still know very little about changing organisational 
cultures, whether in recipient - or donor - countries. 
However, we can identify three types of obstacles that may be relevant to bilateral 
donors. First come the four R's: Rules, Regulation, Routines and Rationalisation. Legal 
obstacles may keep donors from moving from TC to, say, budget support. 
Bureaucratic routines in donor headquarters, or in the administration may not be 
susceptible to change: maintaining the status quo requires no argument; changing it 
certainly does. In addition, the lack of change - again in particular, resistance to 
more fungible forms of aid - is often rationalised in the context of accountability to 
the tax-payer. 
On one level, this argument has little validity, because donor organisations are not 
accountable to the tax-payers, but to the government. On another level, however, it 
is difficult to judge how "the tax-payer" would react to reports of misappropriation 
of funds, or simply inefficient aid. In part, this may explain the insistence of some 
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donors in maintaining a focus on "hard" and measurable outputs rather than "soft" 
objectives like capacity development: it is easier to explain to "the tax-payer" what aid 
is supposed to do and how it can be measured if goals are framed in number of stu-
dents, number of courses or number of ambulances, rather than how national 
capacity to manage the economy has increased. 
Another closely related reason is the lack of good - and replicable - ideas. Although 
many donors have indeed experimented in TC, few others have actually emulated 
these experiments - perhaps because they find the outcomes dubious for other con-
texts. Trust also enters the picture. Despite the efforts of many recipient countries to 
improve their public sectors, usually under IMF programmes, donors may not want 
to leave their resources untied in the hands of governments which the international 
financial institutions deem prone to corruption or the misappropriation of funds -
or they may simply have objectives which are not completely consistent with those of 
the recipient government. 
Second, donors face a number of conflicts, among the most profound the 
"Prisoners' Dilemma" type, i.e., conflicts between the individually good and the col-
lectively good. Another, far more blatant conflict is the one between short- and 
long-term objectives. In many donor organisations, the incentive structure is such -
often implicitly- that those that disburse closest to the target are rewarded. However, 
in the long run, donors in fact aspire to a disbursement rate that is sustainable in the 
sense that the recipient can absorb the resources. Here lies a conflict, because 
donors may wish to disburse resources at a rate faster than that at which the recipi-
ent can absorb funds, certainly in the short term. The poorest countries, with cash 
budgets and relatively stringent conditions for fiscal reform, tend to be those least 
able to absorb - even where, in the long term, a donors would want a disbursement 
rate compatible with the recipient's absorptive capacity. 
Donors also face dilemmas relating to coordination: what is rational for an individ-
ual donor is not necessarily rational for the donor community as a whole. One such 
conflict is supplementing salaries, the practice by which donors employ civil servants 
to work on aid projects and usually pay them an amount substantially above their 
normal remuneration. From the donor official's point of view, this practice is quite 
useful, because it enables her (or him) to put the project in place on the ground and 
to disburse funds (which, in turn, improves the official's disbursement record). On 
the other hand, the practice distorts labour markets, increases competition (often 
disguised) from other donors, disrupts relations in the civil service, and may even 
slow down public sector reforms. In this conflict, short-term interests often take 
precedence over long-term considerations. 
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The third major reason why donors are slow to change is that they have little to gain 
from it or (which is more or less the same thing), they have much to lose from 
increased coordination. If donor coordination increases - be it coordinated action 
on tying aid, salary supplements, or basket funding - gains to the recipient may be 
significant, but gains to the individual donor are difficult to identify (to say nothing 
of the difficulty of earmarking the benefit of coordination of activity X to donor Y, 
which the donor can use as rationalisation to tax-payers). In addition, the cost of 
abstaining from cooperation is very low: a donor suffers little from endorsing a 
reduction of tying aid and not actually abiding by that endorsement. To our knowl-
edge, no estimate of this kind of cost exists, but it would be surprising indeed if the 
costs were high; business on the ground is a very different matter from high-level 
political decisions. In addition, if donors gain from the existing situation - by, for 
instance, having "ears" in the ministries - they may actually face a loss if they coop-
erate with other donors in discontinuing their own business-as-usual. 
In sum, it seems reasonable to say that a major obstacle to change is that the donors' 
benefits from the prevailing situation are seldom articulated and thus not taken into 
account. Almost all donor officials reply to the question "Why do donors give aid?" 
with the phrase "out of compassion". Recipients give different, but varied answers. 
The impression that emerges is that many donors pursue a hidden agenda.r; If this is 
not made explicit, radical change for the benefit of the recipients is not likely. 
How Do Donors Change? 
As this report has tried to show, donors reform frequently, albeit often in an unco-
ordinated and sometimes hasty fashion. Some changes can possibly be classified as 
joint action, most significantly, the move towards sector approaches. Though it is dif-
ficult to isolate a single reason for this, several likely candidates are a growing 
dissatisfaction with project aid; increased capacity in several recipient governments; 
and an increased recognition of the importance of recipients' ownership. 
Nonetheless, although a great deal of donor rhetoric has emphasised a shift from 
project aid to sector programmes, it is by no means a global phenomenon - not even 
a particularly pronounced one in countries that actually have the capacity. In 
Tanzania, arguably among the African countries with most local capacity, the share 
of aid earmarked for projects has increased appreciably in the 1990s - from an aver-
age of a third in 1991/93 to almost two-thirds in the later years of the decade 
(Danielson and Dijkstra, 2002: Table 2.4). 
Alt110ugh numerous changes have indeed taken place, donors sometimes go in dif-
ferent directions. As noted earlier, donor countries such as the Netherlands, 
6 The question was not part of a structured questionnaire, one that we have asked from time to time over the years. 
Discussions with colleagues who have asked similar questions confirm our impression. 
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Norway, Sweden and possibly Canada attempt to do away altogether with the con-
cept of TC - if not its instruments -while countries such as Denmark discard earlier 
strategies to do so, implementing instead a strategy that does not explicitly address 
the question of the desirable number of long-term experts. 
One of the bolder innovations seems to be Sweden's Contract-Financed Technical 
Assistance, in which SIDA tries to play the role of facilitator. Limiting SIDA action 
to identifying and implementing projects appears to strengthen local ownership 
and sustainable collaboration between Swedish firms and counterparts in recipient 
countries. To our knowledge, no other donor country is currently contemplating a 
similar approach. 
What Facilitates Donor Change? 
One can also rephrase this question as "Why does the pace of change differ among 
donors?" If one accepts our view that donors gain something from technical coop-
eration (control, re-flow of resources, etc.), the most obvious factor appears to be 
the amount of aid that the donor disburses in the form of TC: the larger the share 
of TC, the more severe the obstacles to change, because the cost of change increas-
es. Apart from this, we can identify five major reasons for differences in donor 
willingness to change: 
First, donors may resist change because they have little faith in the recipient's ability to 
control resources properly. The government may be weak, there may be corruption, or 
the objectives or the government may not be fully endorsed by the donor. 
Second, the culture of the donor organisation may not encourage change. For 
donor organisations built around a project approach in which TC plays a major 
part, the impetus for change simply may not exist and there may be strong vested 
interests against change.7 In addition strong hierarchies do not tend to encourage 
self-assessment, which further dampens the willingness to change. High staff 
turnover also weakens institutional memory, further lowering the possibility of 
learning from history. 
Third, the institutional landscape probably plays a major role. In Norway and Sweden, 
where donor organisations enjoy substantial autonomy, change is likely to be faster 
since the stimulus to change - and perhaps the ideas on how to change - often come 
from staff with recent experience of the situation at the grassroots level. In otl1er 
cases, such as USAID, reforms such as budget support are not realistic alternatives to 
7 We do not claim that all - or even the most important - vested interests are located inside the donor organisations. 
Local elites often have mnch to gain from status quo, as may parts of the development industry (including consul-
tancy firms) and the private sector in donor countries in which aid is tied. 
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TC, or - as is the case with Gennany's GTZ - the organisation was initially established 
primarily to implement TC projects. 
The relations between the donor organisation and the country's Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and Finance are obviously important as well. As changing TC often 
means increasing fungible resources at the expense of TC, the Ministry of Finance 
may be much less enthusiastic about the prospect of using scarce resources for loose-
ly defined objectives in countries with weak administrative structures and visible 
corruption. Similarly, even though geopolitical arguments for foreign aid weakened 
considerably during the 1990s, they have not disappeared entirely. It is quite con-
ceivable that donor countries still wish to use foreign aid to promote objectives not 
primarily related to alleviating poverty in poor countries - for which TC may some-
times be the most efficient means. 
Fourth, and related to the second point above , the autonomy of field offices to 
some extent determines the possibility of change. If field offices are tightly con-
trolled by headquarters, they have less room to manoeuvre towards possible change. 
Their routines and modes of delivery are likely to be standardised. Moreover, the 
changes they are able to promote may not necessarily suit or be warranted in all 
recipient countries. 
Fifth, change may be slow because donors have few reasonable alternatives to TC. 
Budget support is not always a viable alternative. Sometimes, but not always, a focus 
on a better utilisation of local capacity is warranted - or a transfer of initiative to 
recipients. In some cases traditional TC is necessary, either because the government 
lacks the capacity or willingness to manage aid resources in a way satisfactory to 
donors, or because TC resources are needed for gap-filling. Despite the many prob-
lems of traditional forms of TC, it remains necessary in many countries - both as 
gap-filling and capacity building - as a contribution to development objectives. If 
donors reform because they find the existing situation unsatisfactory rather than 
because they have found better alternatives, there is a risk of throwing out the baby 
with the bath-water. This means that rapid change is not necessarily better than slow 
change; failures carry costs. 
Components of Better TC 
Despite the impossibility of prescribing for any and all situations, there remain five 
thoughts for consideration in any discussion about a general overhaul of TC in 
Africa and possibly elsewhere. 
1. Better donor coordination can improve the efficiency of TC. A recent study of pooling of 
technical assistance (Baser and Morgan, 2001) claims that TC pooling can 
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increase TC efficiency and, at the same time, increase the ownership of recipi-
ents. It should however be considered part and parcel of the broader reform 
efforts and is therefore most suitable for use in countries in which civil service 
reforms have advanced fairly far. Better donor coordination also means that DAC 
donors ensure that DAC recommendations are actually implemented, particular-
ly relevant with regard to aid tying. 
2. Donors have conflicts that should be explicitly addressed. These fall into two main types: 
short-run vs long-run conflicts and individual vs collective conflicts. The first refer 
in particular to the conflict between disbursement targets and sustainability objec-
tives. The second refers in particular to the situation in which what is rational for 
the individual donor is not rational for the donor community (one example is 
salary supplementation). To address these conflicts, it is necessary to redesign the 
incentive structures faced by field offices and officials in donor organisations. 
3. The importance attached to the tax-payer argument indicates how the donor has Jailed as a 
public educator. As capacity increases in recipient countries, along with public sec-
tor reform, it makes sense to shift an increasing amount of the aid budget into 
more fungible forms of aid, such as sector support or pure budget support. The 
scope for flag-waving will then narrow. Donors have a task of explaining this to 
the general public in donor countries. If they fail in this and therefore feel com-
pelled to remain in the project mode, they risk slowing the development process. 
4. There is a need for capacity development within donor organisations. Donors are often 
slow in implementing recommendations made by evaluations. Sometimes donor 
organisational reforms or ch anged procedures fail, because the requisite capaci-
ty is simply not there. In addition, a case can be made for reciprocal 
accountability, so that donors reveal their hidden agendas and the control of 
funds is decided mutually, rather than unilaterally by the donors. 
5. Donors should seriously consider implementing national execution (NEX). In essence this 
means that the execution powers are transferred to the recipient government, 
which is likely to enhance local ownership. In addition, UNDP experience ofNEX 
suggests that it is a relatively efficient mode of delivery, at least in those recipient 
countries that have already built some local capacity. However, this does not nec-
essarily imply that bilateral donors should emulate the UNDP method uncritically. 
It is important to consider which components of the aid-relation process (pro-
curement, reporting, recruitment, auditing) can be the responsibility of the 
recipient without putting undue strain on that partner's scarce resources. 
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Foreword 
This second issue of UNDP's Development Policy Journal contains articles by experts 
and practitioners who have participated in our two-year research programme on 
Reforming Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development, funded by the 
Government of the Netherlands. 
As part of its current programme, UNDP commissioned a series of background 
papers and "focus studies" on aspects of how technical cooperation impacts on 
capacity development. These papers drew on a variety of experiences from differ-
ent regions. Early drafts of these papers came under extensive peer review, 
including an author's workshop in Turin, Italy at the end of 2001, attended by 
many development practitioners. The present volume contains condensed versions 
of seven of these papers. 
Each article approaches the role of technical cooperation in capacity development 
from a different perspective. Some of the articles examine the basic premises of tech-
nical cooperation. The others look at the question mainly from either the donor or 
the recipient viewpoint. 
The Development Policy Journal is intended to present original ideas and provoke dis-
cussion. The opinions of the respective authors do not necessarily represent the 
views of UNDP. We welcome reactions to the contents and look forward to receiving 
ideas and articles for future issues. 
Shoji Nishimoto 
Assistant Administrator and Director 
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